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Editorial
Throughout the course of history, our understanding of the state has fundamentally
changed time and again. It appears as though we are witnessing a development
which will culminate in the dissolution of the territorially defined nation state as we
know it, for globalisation is not only leading to changes in the economy and technol-
ogy, but also, and above all, affects statehood. It is doubtful, however, whether the
erosion of borders worldwide will lead to a global state, but what is perhaps of
greater interest are the ideas of state theorists, whose models, theories, and utopias
offer us an insight into how different understandings of the state have emerged and
changed, processes which neither began with globalisation, nor will end with it.
When researchers concentrate on reappropriating classical ideas about the state, it
is inevitable that they will continuously return to those of Plato and Aristotle, upon
which all reflections on the state are based. However, the works published in this se-
ries focus on more contemporary ideas about the state, whose spectrum ranges from
those of the doyen Niccolò Machiavelli, who embodies the close connection be-
tween theory and practice of the state more than any other thinker, to those of
Thomas Hobbes, the creator of Leviathan, to those of Karl Marx, who is without
doubt the most influential modern state theorist, to those of the Weimar state theo-
rists Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller, and finally to those of contem-
porary theorists.
Not only does the corruption of Marx’s ideas into a Marxist ideology intended to
justify a repressive state underline that state theory and practice cannot be perma-
nently regarded as two separate entities, but so does Carl Schmitt’s involvement in
the manipulation conducted by the National Socialists, which today tarnishes his im-
age as the leading state theorist of his era. Therefore, we cannot forego analysing
modern state practice.
How does all this enable modern political science to develop a contemporary un-
derstanding of the state? This series of publications does not only address this
question to (political) philosophers, but also, and above all, students of humanities
and social sciences. The works it contains therefore acquaint the reader with the gen-
eral debate, on the one hand, and present their research findings clearly and informa-
tively, not to mention incisively and bluntly, on the other. In this way, the reader is
ushered directly into the problem of understanding the state.
 
Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Voigt
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Abbreviations
Ancient authors and their works as well as standard lexica are cited with the abbrevi-
ations of the Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. Simon Hornblower, Antony Spaw-
forth, and Esther Eidinow, 4th ed. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press,
2001. A list of these abbreviations is available online at http://classics.oxfordre.com/
page/abbreviation-list/.
Names of authors and works are also given in unabbreviated form in the index of
passages cited at the end of the book.
In addition to those of the Oxford Classical Dictionary, I use the following abbre-
viations:
DPhA Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, ed. Richard Goulet. Vols.
I-VI. Paris: CRNS Éditions, 1989-2016.
OLD Oxford Latin Dictionary, ed. P. G. W. Glare. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1982.
Plut. Stoic.rep. Plutarch. De Stoicorum repugnantiis = Moralia 1033a-1057b.
Stob. Ioannes Stobaeus. Anthologium. (The two titles Eclogae and Flo-
rilegium by which this work is often cited refer to two halves of
the same work, which had a separate manuscript tradition.)
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Introduction
The Stoics are famous as originators of two central ideas in political theory: cos-
mopolitanism and natural law.1 We have become so familiar with these concepts that
it is difficult to imagine how paradoxical they must have seemed when Zeno of
Citium (334/3-262/1 BCE), the founder of this school of thought, promoted them c.
300 BCE – so much so that they could have appeared to undermine the possibility of
politics and a meaningful conception of the state in any sense. Nomos, law and arbi-
trary, local convention, was perceived as the virtual antonym of phusis (“nature”),
and when Plato has Callicles talk of a “law of nature,”2 it is meant as a provocation
illustrative of that character’s impetuous inconsistency. Especially in Athens, where
Zeno taught, polis – the city state – and citizenship as a member of that polis were
almost tribal notions; the Athenians defined themselves genetically, as a kin group
distinguished from others by their blood and autochthonous origin in Attica, the ter-
ritory of their city.3
Is there still space for political thought about how to assure the permanence and
autarky of a state – topics central to Plato’s and Aristotle’s writing – if the real polis
is coextensive with the cosmos? What is the point of discussing how laws and con-
stitutions may negotiate a fair balance of interests and countervailing social forces, if
the Common Law is as unchangeable as Nature and has been decreed since eternity?
The Stoic conception of the state has far reaching peculiarities that distinguish it
from its more famous predecessors but also from approaches and positions in mod-
1.
1 See Vogt 2008, 3-6, also concerning the differences between the modern concepts and original
Stoic thought. Actually, the Stoics had two different terms: “(what is) just by nature” (dikaion
phusei) and “Common Law” – not “natural law” (Vander Waerdt 1994, 274; Vogt 2008, 16, 161;
Asmis 2008, 4). On the precursors and reception until Rousseau, see Kaufmann 2008. He
sketches the main strands: “[…] ist es die platonisch-aristotelische Konzeption eines von Natur
Rechten, die sie, inhaltlich entscheidend modifiziert, mit der monistisch-pantheistischen Logos-
philosophie Heraklits und zugleich mit der sophistischen Relativierung der geltenden Gesetze
verbinden. Die stoische Moral- und Rechtsphilosophie erfährt dadurch eine kosmologische
Fundierung, wie sie die klassische griechische Philosophie nicht kannte. Anders als für Heraklit
gelten die menschlichen νόμοι den Stoikern allerdings nicht mehr generell als Ausfluß des einen
göttlichen Nomos; vielmehr unterscheiden sie gerade scharf zwischen dem Weltgesetz und den
menschlichen Gesetzen, modern gesprochen: zwischen natürlichem und positivem Recht. Hinzu
kommt, daß die Stoiker zum erstenmal innerhalb der Geschichte der abendländischen Philoso-
phie nicht nur polis- bzw. bürgerbezogen, sondern dezidiert menschheitsbezogen über Recht und
Gerechtigkeit philosophieren, so daß ein in jeder Hinsicht universales Naturrecht erst von ihnen
begründet werden konnte” (242).
2 Plato. Gorgias 483e: nomos tēs phuseōs.
3 See Richter 2011 on this idea “that the political community is or ought to be coterminous with
what we might call a biologically homogenous collectivity” (4, 6, 25f., and passim).
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ern political philosophy, even if those philosophers locate themselves in a tradition
of which the Stoics are the beginning, or at least a part.
A State?
Given that the term “state” is not an ancient one and connected to the rise of the
modern nation state, the use of the word in a book about political ideas of ancient
Stoics requires some justification. To which degree is that which the Greek Stoics
call polis a state or not a state?
My first reason for preferring the term “state” is the lack of better alternatives.
The more general concept of a polity – understood as a matrix or space of political
action and its constituive institutions and practices – is too wide to do justice to the
rigorous distinctions maintained by the Stoics between a polis in the proper sense
and other political organisms that do not qualify for this appellation. I will therefore
use the word “polity” for state-like entities that are not states in the narrow Stoic
sense.
Nor was it possible to recur to the concept of a “city state.” Unlike Plato and
Aristotle, the Stoics do not think exclusively in terms of the city state, even though
this form of polity is still the foil that provides preconceptions and starting points for
new ideas. Living at a time of shifting political organizations, the founders of Sto-
icism had no reason to think of the city state as the political form par excellence,4
and their basic ideas continued into the Roman Empire. There is not one single type
of polity suitable to serve as the base or umbrella term for all Stoic conceptualiza-
tions of statehood. I will therefore use the word “city” or “city state” only when the
referent is recognizably an actual city state or a polity conceived as such a city state.
The plurality and historical change of political structures also makes it difficult to
align the terminology of our sources with our modern conceptual toolbox. But it also
makes it difficult to pinpoint coherent usages within these sources themselves. For a
Stoic writing in Greek in the second century of the Roman Empire, a polis is not the
same as what the city state of Athens was for Zeno five-hundred years earlier. A fur-
ther layer of complexity is added by mismatch between Greek and Roman terminol-
ogy. Most Stoics wrote in Greek, while Seneca and Cicero expressed themselves in
Latin. Latin ius and lex correspond to but also differ significantly from Greek
dikaion and nomos (p. 158f.). One Latin translation of polis is urbs, which can refer
to a large city or the urban center (Greek: astu) in contrast to the country side; Urbs
capitalized as a name is the city of Rome (which can no longer be adequately de-
scribed as a city state at the time when the Romans begin to write about Stoic philos-
1.1
4 See p. 137ff.; on the city state as a conceptual foil: p. 140.
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ophy). The Romans distinguished different types of cities (e.g. municipium or colo-
nia). As a general term they used the polysemous civitas, a word which is the literal
equivalent of the Greek politeia, but with an inverse etymology: Civitas derives
from the noun civis (“citizen”), whereas the Greek word for citizen (politēs, literally:
polis-man) derives from the noun polis denoting the state to which the citizen be-
longs. A civitas is often a city state or a city with some kind of self-government, but
it can also be a larger state-like unit like a tribe or nation, and it is also used as a
term for politeia in the sense of “constitution,” “citizenship” (the legal status), and
“citizen body” (the collective of citizens). However, unlike Latin civitas, politeia
does not denote the nation or city state itself.5 On the other hand, politeia in the
sense of political life or practice cannot be rendered with the Latin word civitas;
rather a Roman might use a phrase with res publica in this context or refer to the
forum as the place where such activities are performed.6 Both Greeks and Romans
usually refer to a city state or nation by naming its citizens, e.g. “the Athenians,” or,
in the case of ancient Rome, Senatus Populusque Romanus (SPQR: “The Roman
Senate and People”). The Romans may also talk of the Imperium Romanum, which
is both the supremacy of Rome over its provinces and the whole territory with its
political organization. The most general equivalent for both “state” and “politics” in
Latin is res publica, which literally means “public affair” or “public property,”7 that
which is of concern to every citizen and belongs to all, an idea that English transla-
tions often render with the word “commonwealth.” Res publica is also used for the
Latin version of the title of Plato’s political masterpiece, the Politeia, and of the
works that emulate and engage with it, such as Zeno’s Politeia or Cicero’s De re
publica.
When speaking about the Stoic theories in English, I use the word “state” to refer
to the political organism that is called polis in Greek sources and most often res pub-
lica in Latin whenever such an organism is a state in the full Stoic sense. The word
“state” is also used when there is good reason to believe that the entity discussed at
this point is what is defined as a state (polis) in our sources. When politeia seems to
refer to the constitutional or legal structure of a state, I translate it as “constituted
polity.” The original Greek or Latin terms will be indicated regularly as well, in or-
der to allow for a critical assessment of my readings and attempts at disambiguation.
5 That usage is attested only in late antiquity, in an analogous extension of the Latin word civitas
(LSJ s.v. politeia I.4). More on the various meanings of the Greek word politeia below, p. 63.
6 For example: accedere ad rem publicam, gerere rem publicam (OLD s.v. res publica 1); in foro
versari, forum attingere (OLD s.v. forum 4). The law court held by a magistrate in the provinces
was also called a forum, and so forum became a term for towns at which such courts were held
(OLD s.v. 6 and 7). Hence, for example, Forum Iulii, modern Fréjus.
7 On Cicero’s famous explication of the word as res populi (Rep. 1.39), see, e.g., Christes 2007,
90-95.
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A further reason for using the term “state,” even at the risk of anachronism and at
the cost of greater imprecision, regards my intentions in writing this book for the se-
ries Staatsverständnisse. When discussing “the state,” we cannot help but negotiate
political and ethical values. How we conceive of statehood and how we assess the
quality or importance of existing token states is intimately linked to our willingness
to commit, as citizens, to shared objectives and define the means we regard as ac-
ceptable for achieving them. Evidently, rethinking the state is a crucial task of our
times, and if our understanding of the object of discussion is too narrow, we might
deprive ourselves of avenues of thought worthy of exploration.
The Analytical Grid
For structuring my account and formulating questions that I may pose to the scat-
tered and complex material, it was helpful to think in terms of the four constitutive
categories of statehood distinguished by Bob Jessop: population, territory, institu-
tions, and state idea.8 The first two of these are reflected in Stoic definitions of a
polis, or state, in terms of dwelling (oikētērion) and a people, while the categories of
institution, also called “state apparatus” by Jessop, and state idea apply to the Stoic
state only with fundamental but telling qualifications.
Apart from the law itself, institutions play a marginal and fuzzy role in Stoic con-
ceptions of statehood. In the tradition of Max Weber’s analysis of the state as the
bearer of a monopoly of power, Bob Jessop thinks of institutions first of all in terms
of state power.9 This central element in modern theories is alien to the Early Stoic
state. In any case, power to defend a territory against external forces could only
characterize the particular state, not the world state. But particular states too define
themselves by internal cohesion and not by defending a separate territory against
other states. It was a central claim of Zeno’s Politeia that even though humans will
live together as communities located in different places, a reasonable person will see
these particular states as parts of a shared whole, not as competitors for limited
space or other resources (T50 on p. 77). This is one reason why Chrysippus and
1.2
8 Jessop 2016. Jessop thus adds one more category to Georg Jellinek’s (1900) three constituents
of statehood: Staatsvolk, Staatsgebiet, and Staatsgewalt. Rüdiger Voigt (2015, 39) considers but
rejects the addition of a constitution to this threesome. Even though constitutionalism is alien to
at least Early Stoic thought (p. 166, a Stoic might think of the particular laws for a local state as
equivalent to a modern constitution. Like the law of a local Stoic state, a modern constitution is
a changeable adaptation to the particular socio-political context in which it forms the base rules
for a state, and both are formulated with a view to more universal principles. A modern constitu-
tion presupposes human rights and conceptions of just government, whereas the Stoic looks to
the Common Law of which the local law is a particular adaptation. A certain overlap with the
concept of a state objective, at least as I will use it in this book, also obtains if the state is de-
fined as a guarantor of rights and social protection (Voigt 2014, 353).
9 Jessop 2016, 25, 49, and passim.
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probably already Zeno himself declared that in a proper state military force is use-
less.10
When trying to understand the Stoics, we should never forget that material pos-
sessions, bodily health, and even life (one’s own or that of someone else) are “indif-
ferents” (adiaphora) – objects that evoke action impulses and whose motivational
force and thus value is always context-dependent, relative to the actual options at
hand. Indifferents are called so because whether a person attains them or not is irrel-
evant for her attaining a good life. Further, among the indifferents those pertaining to
skheseis – social relations and opportunities to care for others – have a particularly
high relative value, so much so that they are treated as a separate category in the
writings of Imperial Stoics such as the Discourses of Epictetus and Hierocles.
The “Beautiful City” (Kallipolis) that Plato devises in his Politeia, has a soldier
class because of the consumptive needs of this luxurious city: It needs a larger terri-
tory and must fear attacks by neighbors interested in the city’s territory and posses-
sions – with the result that the city’s territory and economy have to grow even fur-
ther to provide for its military forces. In this respect, the Stoic state is more like the
“City of Pigs” which Socrates sketches first but which his interlocutors reject as in-
adequate.11 Like the inhabitants of that simple city, a Stoic sage has no need for
things that can only be obtained by prevailing over others. Nor would she feel very
strongly about keeping the kinds of possessions that a polity can only preserve for its
citizens if it is able to defend its borders against external foes.
In ancient Greece, territorial sovereinty and autonomy were framed in terms of
“freedom” (eleutheria), but the Stoics redefined freedom in a radically different way.
Even if military service or dying for one’s fatherland appears as a civic duty in Stoic
doxographies and later Stoic writings, as part of the sociable acts a sage would per-
form if circumstances so warrant because of the skhesis she has to her home country,
neither military power nor internal policing of citizens is constitutive of statehood as
Stoics understand it.
Nor is state power conceived as necessary for law enforcement and protecting
citizens’ rights. Stoics derive their conception of political freedom from personal
10 Phld. On the Stoics, col. 15f. Dorandi. Since the source is given as Chrysippus’ On the Politeia
– most likely a commentary on Zeno’s Politeia (Schofield 1991, 26) – we can infer that Zeno
himself did not see any use in weapons either (Baldry 1959, 10 n. 12; see also Schofield 1991,
50f.; Bees 2011, 225). Philodemus also informs us that Chrysippus followed Heraclitus in
identifying Zeus with War (Phld. On Piety, PHerc 1428, col. 7 Henrichs = SVF 2.636; discus-
sion, e.g., in Schofield 1991, 74-6, 80). We lack sufficient context to ascertain what Chrysippus
might have meant. One possible explanation is that Chrysippus thinks of Zeus, i.e. the active
principle God, as the origin of opposites (on which see Wildberger 2006, 3.3.3.5), especially
such opposites like virtue and badness, by which some people – the wise ones – are equal to
gods and free, while the others are slaves, just as in the passage from Heraclitus Chrysippus
must have alluded to (frg. 22 B 53 Diels and Kranz).
11 Book 2, 373d-374a; Kallipolis: Book 7, 527c; “luxurious” (truphōsa): 2, 372e; City of Pigs: 2,
372d.
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eleutheria as the opposite of slavery. As Phillip Mitsis proposes, we may here grasp
the germs of a concept of natural human rights as “the authorized exercise of a ca-
pacity or power grounded in nature.”12 Such a right, as it were, to act according to
their own judgment, is in principle given to all human beings. In this sense, Mitsis
was successful in refuting Richard Sorabji’s claim that the Stoics have “an ethics of
duty, not an ethics of right.”13 It is however, important to keep in mind, first, that the
term “duty” does not point to some burdensome obligation. We must rid ourselves
from the modern stereotype of the Stoic resigning to inevitable fate and doggedly
performing her duty with clenched teeth. This is a Neo-Stoic idea (p. 206) and due
to Cicero’s transformation of kathēkon, the target effect a reasonable person aims to
achieve with an action (p. 83), into Roman officium (“service” or “duty”), a term
characteristic of that culture based on reciprocity and patronage, in which social
obligations are services to be rendered according to one’s place in a web of depen-
dencies in return for services received. The original kathēkon has a much wider
meaning and can be any kind of action effect that makes sense in a particular situa-
tion. According to the Early Stoics, a reasonable person goes for a kathēkon as that
which suits her; for her, it is the thing to do. She likes what she does, and a perfect
person is blissfully happy with all that she does and all that happens to her. Freedom
in the Stoic sense is nothing but the authorization to follow one’s heart’s desire and
do what one really wants.14
Second, such a ‘right’ differs from a right in modern discourses of law or justice
in that it is not a right that must be guaranteed or protected by anyone else than the
bearer of the right, let alone by state power; it is in the full power of the right-owner
herself.
For the Stoics […] an individual’s personality is not tied in any fundamental way to an
external thing as property, or […], even to one’s own life or body. […] What is in one’s
power, however, is one’s own moral personality, which consists essentially in one’s
eleutheria and is grounded in one’s power of giving or withholding assent (sunkatathe-
sis). […] we should not […] expect the Stoics to attach rights to what they consider mat-
ters of indifference […].15
As we will be shown in more detail below (p. 101ff.), only the individual agent her-
self can take away her own freedom and deprive herself of the right or power
(exousia) to be the decisive origin of her own actions. A state may take measures to
help and encourage individual agents not to deprive themselves in that way, but the
exertion of state power is likely to play a marginal role in this, if at all. The freedom
of full citizen sages is an unalienable property, something not threatened by any
12 Mitsis 1999, 161; on the question, see also below, p. 166f. with n. 553.
13 Mitsis 1999, 165, referring to Sorabji 1993, 140.
14 This is a variation of Socratic intellectualism. See, e.g., Schofield 1991, 49.
15 Mitsis 1999, 172.
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force outside the subject. As a result, a sage cannot be coerced by any state institu-
tion either. The sage is perfectly suited to obey laws and follow commands (p. 94),
but does so by choice, with free assent, because it suits her, and not in explicit or
implicit submission to a force beyond her control.
While the aspect of state power is thus marginalized, only to return with signifi-
cant force in modern receptions of Stoicism, the fourth aspect of Jessop’s conceptual
grid, the state idea or raison d’état, is so central to the Stoic theory of the state that it
would eclipse the other aspects if it were not possible to discuss them as expressions
of and contributions to the fourth. This is so because, as Katja Vogt argues in her
account of Early Stoic political philosophy, the state is the central expression of the
cosmological teleology of that school. The world exists in order for there to be a
state as that form of community in which all life forms, and in particular the rational
life forms capable of reflective observation and conceptual thought, live the best life
possible for them – including the creator of that cosmos himself, as was confirmed
just a few years ago with the discovery of a piece of inscription in the mountains of
south-eastern Turkey (T58 on p. 93).
For the Stoics this is a fact of nature, and so the term “state objective” is more
appropiate than “state idea.” Nevertheless, since this objective fact must be con-
ceived as something of value, an end of individual strivings, and then expressed in
actions, practices, and institutions both by individuals and their communities if they
wish to be states, citizens, and political animals in the proper sense of these words,
the state objective is also an idea, an ideal to aspire to and implement in one’s local
context.
In what follows, I will first set out the actual evidence for a Stoic definition of the
term polis (ch. 2), a task that will involve already some conceptual exploration but
also close reading and fine-grained philological work. As Malcolm Schofield’s in-
fluential book on The Stoic Idea of the City (1991) amply demonstrates, any serious
study of Stoic thought consists to a large portion in the reconstruction of lost texts,
their exact wording, and the exact meaning of those words. Chapter 2 thus serves as
a warning, as it illustrates the uncertainty of whatever claim a reader makes about
Stoic thought. It will be impossible to continue at the same level of detail throughout
the book, and some readers may not be interested in all those tricky little issues any-
way. All the same, I will let the sources speak for themselves as much as possible,
building my account through exegesis of literal quotations, for which I have either
carefully adapted the best existing translations or, more frequently, proposed a new
translation of my own.
The following chapters will elucidate the single definientia identified in the sec-
ond chapter: that the state is a dwelling (chs. 3 and 4), that it is administrated (ch. 4)
by law (ch. 5), and that it is a population thus administrated (ch. 6). Already in this
context it will be necessary to address the concept of a world state or cosmic polity
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(ch. 4), while the role of particular polities and their relation to the whole is the topic
of chapter 7.
We find traces of all three traditional aspects of statehood in the Stoic definition
of polis: the population, the territory (in the definiens “dwelling”), and state institu-
tions both insofar the state is “administrated by law” and, in one definition, has ur-
ban structures and institutions associated with the city center. The state objective, the
fourth aspect that Bob Jessop adds to the triad, is implicit in those terms, and the
quest for such implicit connotations informs the discussion from chapter 2 to chapter
7. Particularly relevant to this aspect are sections 3.2, 4.3.3-4, 5.4, 6.6 and 7.2.
Chapters 8 and 9 supplement the systematic outline in the first part with a
diachronic account of ancient Stoicism from the beginnings in the third century BCE
to the second century CE. At the same time, this section continues to explore ques-
tions raised in chapter 7 about the role of particular polities in that it considers how
the theories of individual philosophers are reflected in what we still know about
their political practice. It will also be interesting to see how they adapt the concep-
tions of their school to the changing socio-political contexts in which they live.
Chapter 8 treats the Early Stoics and compares their practice to what we know about
Stoic discussions of political involvement generally. Chapter 9 is devoted to Stoi-
cism after it has arrived in Rome: the Middle Stoics and, in a longer section, the Im-
perial Stoics, whose thought is much better preserved and among whom there are
two, Seneca and Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who had a leading function in the gov-
ernment of the empire.
By way of a conclusion, the final chapter (ch. 10) discusses three adaptations of
Stoic thought in early modern and modern political thought: by Justus Lipsius, Im-
manuel Kant, and Martha C. Nussbaum. It illustrates the presence of Stoicism in our
political thought and conceptions of the state today, but also significant absences or
differences. The chapter will thus demonstrate the fecundity of Stoic thought and
provide an opportunity to explore its peculiarities in even sharper relief against the
backdrop of well known established theories. Thus, one or the other road for further
exploration not yet taken by the Stoics’ modern readers may present itself as an invi-
tation to continue the dialogue.
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